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Conquest dynasty

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

A conquest dynasty (Chinese: 征服王朝; pinyin: Zhēngfú Wángcháo) in the history of China refers to a Chinese dynasty established by non-Han ethnicities which ruled parts or all of China proper, the traditional heartland of the Han people, and whose rulers may or may not have fully assimilated into the dominant Han culture. Four major dynasties have been considered "conquest dynasties": the Liao (916–1125), the Jin (1115–1234), Yuan (1271–1368), and Qing (1644–1912).

Concept

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The term "conquest dynasty" was coined by the German-American sinologist Karl August Wittfogel in his 1949 revisionist history of the Liao dynasty (916–1125). He argued that the Liao, as well as the Jin (1115–1234), Yuan (1271–1368), and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties of China were not really "Chinese", and that the ruling families did not fully assimilate into the dominant Han culture.[1] The "conquest dynasty" concept was warmly received by mostly Japanese scholars such as Otagi Matsuo, who preferred to view these dynasties in the context of a "history of Asia" rather than a "history of China". Alternative views to the concept of "conquest dynasty" from American sinologists include Owen Lattimore's idea of the steppe as a "reservoir", Wolfram Eberhard's concept of a "superstratification" of Chinese society with nomadic peoples, and Mary C. Wright's thesis of sinicization. Among historians, the labelling of "conquest dynasties" has proven to be controversial, especially when using such characterization on dynasties such as the Jin.[2] Meanwhile, not all non-Han regimes were seen as "conquest dynasties" by Karl August Wittfogel; some of these regimes, such as the Northern Wei, were considered "infiltration dynasties" by him.[3]

Scope of China (Zhongguo)

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In the English language, "Zhongguo ren" (中國人; "People of China") is frequently confused and conflated with "Han ren" (漢人; "Han people").[4]

The term Zhongguo was used initially around the tenth century BCE and did not refer to any specific ethnicity. This ambiguity allowed different interchangeable definitions to come into existence later on. Dynasties of ethnic Han origin used "Zhongguo" (中國; "Middle Kingdom") to refer to Han areas of their empire. Non-Han founders of dynasties used the term to refer to a combined state of Hans and non-Hans.[5] The Ming dynasty used Zhongguo politically to refer to the entire country but culturally to refer to only Han areas of the empire.[6]

The Xianbei-led Northern Wei referred to itself as "Zhongguo" and claimed yogurt as a food of Zhongguo.[7] Similarly, the Jurchen-led Jin dynasty referred to itself as "Zhongguo".[8]

In 1271, Kublai Khan proclaimed the Yuan dynasty with the official name "Great Yuan" (大元) and claimed succession from former Chinese dynasties from the Three Sovereigns and Five Emperors up to the Tang dynasty. Han Chinese literati during the Mongol period thought that China, after a few centuries of division and dissension, was finally reunified by the Yuan dynasty. Their view was not shared by all contemporaries, especially the Mongols and other non-Han people (Semu) who had quite different ideas about China, and the latter considered several different kingdoms or countries as having been conquered and brought under the control of the Mongols. But similar to the development in Mongol Iran, native intellectuals interested in their own history interpreted the unification by the Mongols as a revival of their dynastic tradition, and the concept of Zhongguo was considered an important ideology and was further developed by the subsequent Ming dynasty. The revival of the concept of territorial unity, although not intended by the Mongols, became a lasting legacy of Mongol rule in China (and Iran).[9]: 289–292 

Qing emperors referred to all subjects of the Qing dynasty regardless of their ethnicity as "Chinese" (中國之人), and used the term "Zhongguo" as a synonym for the entire Qing Empire while using "neidi" (内地; "inner regions") to refer only to the core area (or China proper) of the empire. The Qing Empire was viewed as a single multi-ethnic entity.[10][11]

The Qing emperors governed frontier non-Han areas in a separate administrative system under the Lifan Yuan. Nonetheless, it was the Qing emperors who expanded the definition of Zhongguo and made it "flexible" by using that term to refer to the entire empire. Zhongguo was also used by the Qing Empire as an endonym in diplomatic correspondence. However, some Han subjects criticized their usage of the term and used Zhongguo only to refer to the seventeen provinces of China and three provinces of the east (Manchuria), excluding other frontier areas.[12] Han literati who remained loyal to the Ming dynasty held to defining the old Ming borders as "China" and used the term "foreigner" to describe ethnic minorities under Qing rule, such as the Mongols, as part of their anti-Qing ideology.[13] As the territorial borders of the Qing Empire were fixed through a series of treaties with neighboring foreign powers, it was able to inculcate in the Qing subjects a sense that China included areas such as Mongolia and Tibet due to educational reforms. Specifically, the educational reform made it clear where the borders of the Qing Empire were, even if Han subjects did not understand how the Chinese identity included Mongols and Tibetans or understand what the connotations of being "Chinese" were.[14]

In an attempt to portray different ethnicities as part of one family ruled by the Qing dynasty, the phrase "Zhongwai yijia" (中外一家; "interior and exterior as one family") was used to convey the idea of the "unification" of different ethnic groups.[15] After conquering China proper, the Manchus identified their state as "China" (中國; Zhōngguó; "Middle Kingdom"), and referred to it as "Dulimbai Gurun" in the Manchu language (Dulimbai means "central" or "middle", while gurun means "nation" or "state"). The emperors labelled the lands of the Qing Empire (including present-day Northeast China, Xinjiang, Mongolia, Tibet, and other areas) as "China" in both the Chinese and Manchu languages. This effectively defined China as a multi-ethnic state, thereby rejecting the idea that "China" only meant Han-populated areas. The Qing emperors proclaimed that both Han and non-Han ethnic groups were part of "China". They also used both "China" and "Qing" to refer to their state in official documents, international treaties (the Qing Empire was known internationally as "China"[16] or the "Chinese Empire"[17]), and foreign affairs. The "Chinese language" (Dulimbai gurun i bithe) included Chinese, Manchu, Mongol, and Tibetan languages, while the "Chinese people" (中國之人; Zhōngguó zhī rén; Manchu: Dulimbai gurun i niyalma) referred to all subjects of the Qing Empire.[18]

In the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk, the term "China" (Dulimbai Gurun; Zhongguo) was used to refer to the Qing territories in Manchuria in both the Manchu and Chinese language versions of the treaty. Additionally, the term "the wise Emperor of China" was also used in the Manchu version of the treaty.[19]

The Qianlong Emperor rejected the earlier idea that only the Han people could be subjects of China and only Han lands could be considered as part of China. Instead, he redefined China as being multi-ethnic, saying in 1755 that "there exists a view of China (Zhongxia; 中夏), according to which non-Han peoples cannot become China's subjects and their lands cannot be integrated into the territory of China. This does not represent our dynasty's understanding of China, but is instead a view of the earlier Han, Tang, Song, and Ming dynasties."[5] The Qianlong Emperor rejected the views of ethnic Han officials who claimed that Xinjiang was not part of China and that he should not annex it, putting forth the argument that China was multi-ethnic and did not just refer to Han areas.[20]

When the Qing conquered Dzungaria, they proclaimed that the new land which formerly belonged to the Oirat-led Dzungar Khanate was now absorbed into China (Dulimbai Gurun) in a Manchu language memorial.[21][22][23]

The Yongzheng Emperor spoke out against the claim by anti-Qing rebels that the Qing dynasty were only the rulers of the Manchus and not of China, saying "The seditious rebels claim that we are the rulers of Manchus and only later penetrated central China to become its rulers. Their prejudices concerning the division of their and our country have caused many vitriolic falsehoods. What these rebels have not understood is the fact that it is for the Manchus the same as the birthplace is for the people of the Central Plain. Shun belonged to the Eastern Yi, and King Wen to the Western Yi. Does this fact diminish their virtues?"[24]

According to scholar Sergius L. Kuzmin of the Russian Academy of Sciences, despite the Qing dynasty's usage of the term "China", these empires were known officially by their respective dynastic name. Non-Han peoples considered themselves as subjects of the Yuan and Qing empires and did not necessarily equate them to "China". This resulted from different ways of the Yuan and Qing legitimization for different peoples in these empires.[25][26] Qing emperors were referred to as "Khagan of China" (or "Chinese khagan") by their Turkic Muslim subjects (now known as the Uyghurs),[27] as "Bogda Khan" or "(Manchu) Emperor" by their Mongol subjects, and as "Emperor of China" (or "Chinese Emperor") and "the Great Emperor" (or "Great Emperor Manjushri") by their Tibetan subjects, such as in the 1856 Treaty of Thapathali.[28][29][30] It is pointed out that Tibetan subjects regarded the Qing as Chinese, unlike the Yuan which was founded by Mongols.[31] According to Kuzmin, the Liao, Jin, Yuan and Qing were multi-national empires led by non-Chinese peoples to whom the conquered China or its part was joined.[32] Nevertheless, American historian Richard J. Smith points out "China proper" (often designated 内地 meaning "inner territory" in Chinese) refers to the core eighteenth provinces of the Qing dynasty, but from a Manchu perspective, however, the concept of “China” (Chinese: Zhongguo; Manchu: Dulimbai Gurun) embraced the entire empire, including Manchuria, Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet.[33]

The modern territorial claims of both the People's Republic of China, based in Beijing, and the Republic of China, based in Taipei, are derived from the territories that were held by the Qing dynasty at the time of its demise.[34][35][36] The nationalistic concept of the Zhonghua minzu (Chinese nation) also traces its roots to the multiethnic and multicultural nature of the Qing Empire.[37]

Alternative views

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Former history professor Hugh R. Clark presents another view on the subject. In his formulation, Chineseness centered around the culture of the Central Plain built up over time. Each major Chinese dynasty represented the frontier of what was Sinitic, beyond which was considered uncivilized. When a new dynasty gained control of the Central Plain, elements of an outside culture would be added to what had come before. In this way, most Chinese dynasties, not just the Yuan and the Qing, can be regarded as conquest dynasties, even traditionally Sinitic ones such as the Zhou and the Qin.[38]

CCP rejection of the concept

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In 2023, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) requested historians make changes to a draft of an official History of Qing tome, initiated by the late historian Dai Yi, to better align with Xi Jinping's vision for the future.[39] According to historian Pamela Kyle Crossley, the CCP under Xi has rejected the concept of conquest dynasties because it could encourage separatist sentiments in Tibet and Xinjiang as well as advance calls for Taiwanese independence.[39] Crossley further stated that "[a]ccording to Xi Jinping, there have been no conquests in Chinese history. Only happy unifications with people aspiring to be Chinese."[39]

See also

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References

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Citations

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  1. ^ Crossley, Pamela Kyle (December 1985). "An Introduction to the Qing Foundation Myth". Late Imperial China. 6 (2): 13–24. doi:10.1353/late.1985.0016. ISSN 1086-3257.
  2. ^ Tao, Jing-shen. The Jurchen in Twelfth-Century China: A Study of Sinicization. University of Washington Press. pp. xi–x.
  3. ^ Karl A Wittfogel (1946). History of Chinese Society-Liao: Transactions, American Philosophical Society (Vol. 36, Part 1). American Philosophical Society. p. 24. ISBN 9781422377192.
  4. ^ Liu 2004, p. 266.
  5. ^ a b Zhao 2006, p. 4.
  6. ^ Jiang 2011, p. 103.
  7. ^ Scott Pearce; Audrey G. Spiro; Patricia Buckley Ebrey (2001). Culture and Power in the Reconstitution of the Chinese Realm, 200-600. Harvard Univ Asia Center. pp. 22–. ISBN 978-0-674-00523-5. Archived from the original on 2024-07-14. Retrieved 2021-05-14.
  8. ^ Patricia Buckley Ebrey; Anne Walthall; James B. Palais (2013). East Asia: A Cultural, Social, and Political History, Volume I: To 1800. Cengage Learning. pp. 138–. ISBN 978-1-111-80815-0. Archived from the original on 2024-07-14. Retrieved 2021-05-14.
  9. ^ Kim, Hodong (2015). "Was 'Da Yuan' a Chinese Dynasty?". Journal of Song-Yuan Studies. 45 (1): 279–305. doi:10.1353/sys.2015.0007. ISSN 2154-6665.
  10. ^ Elena Barabantseva (2010). "Overseas Chinese, Ethnic Minorities and Nationalism: De-Centering China (2010) (pages 20-22)". New York: Routledge. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2022-08-16.
  11. ^ Yuan-kang WANG (May 2013). "Managing Hegemony in East Asia: China's Rise in Historical Perspective" (PDF). Western Michigan University. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2022-04-10.
  12. ^ Esherick 2006, p. 232.
  13. ^ Mosca, Matthew W. (December 2011). "The Literati Rewriting of China in the Qianlong-Jiaqing Transition". Late Imperial China. 32 (2): 89–132. doi:10.1353/late.2011.0012. ISSN 1086-3257.
  14. ^ Esherick 2006, p. 251.
  15. ^ Elliott & Chia (2004), pp. 76–77.
  16. ^ Treaty of Nanking. 1842.
  17. ^ McKinley, William. "Second State of the Union Address". 5 Dec. 1898.
  18. ^ Zhao (2006), pp. n 4, 7–10, and 12–14.
  19. ^ Zhao (2006), pp. 8 and 12.
  20. ^ Zhao 2006, pp. 11-12.
  21. ^ Dunnell 2004 Archived 2023-04-11 at the Wayback Machine, p. 77.
  22. ^ Dunnell 2004 Archived 2023-04-11 at the Wayback Machine, p. 83.
  23. ^ Elliott 2001 Archived 2023-04-11 at the Wayback Machine, p. 503.
  24. ^ Yongzheng Emperor. 大義覺迷錄 [Record of how great righteousness awakens the misguided], 近代中國史料叢刊 [Collection of materials on modern Chinese history] (Taipei: 文海出版社, 1966), vol. 36, 351–2, 1: 2b–3a.
  25. ^ Kuzmin, Sergius L. "Dmitriev, S.V. and Kuzmin, S.L. 2012. What is China? The Middle State in historical myth and real policy, Oriens (Moscow), no 3, pp. 5-19". Archived from the original on 2022-02-12. Retrieved 2015-02-08.
  26. ^ Kuzmin, Sergius L. "Dmitriev, S.V. and Kuzmin, S.L. 2014. Qing Empire as China: anatomy of a historical myth, Oriens (Moscow), no 1, pp. 5-17". Archived from the original on 2017-03-17. Retrieved 2015-02-08.
  27. ^ Onuma, Takahiro (2014). "The Qing Dynasty and Its Central Asian Neighbors". Saksaha: A Journal of Manchu Studies. 12 (20220303). doi:10.3998/saksaha.13401746.0012.004. Archived from the original on September 19, 2023. Retrieved September 17, 2023.
  28. ^ "Treaty between Tibet and Nepal, 1856 (translation)" (PDF). Archived (PDF) from the original on 2023-08-26. Retrieved 2023-09-03.
  29. ^ Bell, Charles (1992). Tibet Past and Present. Motilal Banarsidass. p. 278. ISBN 9788120810679. Archived from the original on 2023-10-29. Retrieved 2023-10-30.
  30. ^ Dunnell, Ruth (2004). New Qing Imperial History: The Making of Inner Asian Empire at Qing Chengde. Taylor & Francis. p. 124. ISBN 9781134362226.
  31. ^ Santa Barbara, "A Union of Religion and Politics: The Tibetan Regency of Ngawang Tsültrim", Page 18
  32. ^ Kuzmin, Sergius L.; Dmitriev, Sergey. "Dmitriev, S.V. and Kuzmin, S.L. 2015. Conquest Dynasties of China or Foreign Empires? The Problem of Relations between China, Yuan and Qing, International J. Central Asian Studies, vol. 19, pp. 59-91". Archived from the original on 2018-09-21. Retrieved 2016-06-11.
  33. ^ Smith, Richard J. (2015). The Qing Dynasty and Traditional Chinese Culture. Lantham, Boulder, New York and London: Rowman and Littlefield. p. 448. ISBN 9781442221925.
  34. ^ Esherick, Joseph; Kayali, Hasan; Van Young, Eric (2006). Empire to Nation: Historical Perspectives on the Making of the Modern World. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. p. 245. ISBN 9780742578159. Archived from the original on 2024-07-14. Retrieved 2021-05-22.
  35. ^ Zhai, Zhiyong (2017). 憲法何以中國. City University of HK Press. p. 190. ISBN 9789629373214. Archived from the original on 2024-07-14. Retrieved 2021-05-22.
  36. ^ Gao, Quanxi (2016). 政治憲法與未來憲制. City University of HK Press. p. 273. ISBN 9789629372910. Archived from the original on 2024-07-14. Retrieved 2021-05-22.
  37. ^ Wai-Chung Ho (2018). Culture, Music Education, and the Chinese Dream in Mainland China. Springer Nature Singapore. p. 38. ISBN 9789811075339.
  38. ^ Clark, Hugh R. (May 2018). "What's the Matter with "China"? A Critique of Teleological History". The Journal of Asian Studies. 77 (2): 295–314. doi:10.1017/S0021911817001358.
  39. ^ a b c Wong, Chun Han. "Xi Jinping's Historians Can't Stop Rewriting China's Imperial Past". The Wall Street Journal. Archived from the original on 2024-03-23. Retrieved 2024-03-23.

Sources

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