Draft:Polish self-defence in Volhynia

Self-defence centres in Volhynia (1943).

Polish self-defence in Volhynia - armed formations of Polish civilians and Home Army units to defend against the mass murder of Poles by Ukrainian nationalists.

Formation of defence

The beginning of Polish self-defence in Volhynia dates back to the turn of 1942. Similar units were established in the former provinces of the Second Polish Republic: Lwów, Stanisławów (Subcarpathia) and Tarnopol (the Western part of Podolia). There were two forms of Polish defence in Volhynia.:

• Self-defence: Self-defence outposts, centres and bases;
• Guerrila divisions.

A self-defence unit was an organised and armed group led by one person or a self-defence committee. In towns (e.g. Dubno, Rokitno), self-defence units were relatively covert and operated in the suburbs due to German forces.

A self-defence outpost was a single Polish settlement (village or colony) guarded by a self-defence unit. Temporarily, such units cooperated with partisan units. Self-defence posts were established in villages with a large Polish population. Outposts in villages where Poles were a minority were rare. The Polish population in such villages was usually defenceless.

Self-defence centres (bases) were groups of Polish settlements with their own defensive fortifications, supporting each other and undertaking joint actions. Often, the bases permanently cooperated with partisan units.

Self-defence

Begginings

The conspiracy existing among the Polish population of Volhynia faced many problems. Above all, there was a lack of people with military and leadership experience; most of the more prominent local figures had been eliminated by the Soviets in 1939-1941. There was a shortage of weapons and the Ukrainian threat was overlooked.

The first self-defence units were formed at the turn of 1942/43. They were organised spontaneously by local leaders of the Polish community. Initially, self-defence was limited to patrolling the area, posting guards, warning the local population of the appearance of unknown armed units. In the early spring of 1943, as the mass murders of Poles intensified, the number of observation posts and patrols was increased and outposts began to be supplied with firearms. The effectiveness of the self-defence units during this period was low; they were poorly armed and unable to defend themselves against the much more numerous units of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).

Attempt at organisation

After the first grassroots attempts to create self-defence, this process was supported and brought under conspiratorial control by the Home Army, which was ordered in April 1943 by the Home Army Volhynia District Commander, Colonel Kazimierz Bąbiński "Luboń":

a/ The spontaneously forming Volhynian self-defence in endangered areas prevents or at least hinders further attacks by rezuns (murderers). I place on the commanders at all levels the duty to take the initiative in organising self-defence in their own hands, without deconstructing their organisational associations. On us, as a cadre of commanders, fell the duty and responsibility for the defence of Poles in Volhynia, since Polish blood has already been shed through no fault of ours.
b/ I forbid the use of methods used by Ukrainian rezuns. We will not burn Ukrainian homesteads or kill Ukrainian women and children in retaliation. Self-defence is to defend ourselves against the attackers or to attack the attackers, leaving the population and their possessions alone.

At the same time, "Luboń" forbade cooperation in self-defence with the Germans (including joining the German police) and the Soviet partisans.

Historical publicist Piotr Zychowicz argues that the structures of the Home Army (AK) failed to provide adequate assistance to the threatened Polish population in the Volhynia area. The possibility of redeploying some AK partisan units from Lubeszczyzna to the Volhynia area was not used. In his opinion, the AK did not take advantage of the possibility of supplying rural self-defences with weapons from the Home Army's warehouses, which were issued a few months later to the 27th Volhynian Division of the AK, created as part of Operation Tempest. Some self-defences, such as those in Przebraże, asked the Germans to grant the villages weapons and ammunition "for the defence of the population against forest gangs". The approval obtained allowed for the creation of a semblance of legality for the defenders of Przebraże to possess any other firearms.

The first major centre of Polish self-defence was organised at the beginning of May 1943 in Pańska Dolina in the Dubien district. It was not until 20 July (after Volhynian Bloody Sunday of 11 July) that the "Instruction on the formation of self-defence bases and the organisation of partisan detachments" was issued by the Regional Government Delegation for Volhynia. The formation of larger self-defence bases, consisting of several villages (outposts) with larger Polish population concentrations begun. Such bases were to be defended by local units, using shooting ditches, primitive wooden and earth bunkers and various types of abatis.

The struggle for survival

The vast majority of self-defence outposts suffered defeat during the assault. When the Red Army entered Volhynia in 1944, the only surviving outposts were: Młynów, Klewań, Rokitno, Kurdyban Warkowicki, Lubomirka, Budki Snowidowickie, Osty. This was due to the presence of German garrisons defending Polish civilians or the activities of Polish and sometimes Soviet partisan units in the area.

However, most of the self-defence bases survived; the UPA only managed to smash the centres: Huta Stepańska-Wyrka (16-18 July 1943) and Antonówka (30 July 1943). The self-defence in Kuty, managed to fend off an attack by the UPA and Melnykov militias, but due to damage and lack of ammunition, evacuated to Szumsk and then Krzemieniec.

Partisan units

Formation of units

After the occupation of Volhynia by the Germans in 1941, it was not possible to create larger partisan units. In August 1942, the AK Headquarters separated the Volhynia district from Area No. 3 (Lwów) and subordinated it directly to itself. In September 1942, Colonel Kazimierz Bąbiński, pseud. "Luboń", was appointed District Commander. The District Delegate of the Government was Kazimierz Banach, pseud. "Jan Linowski" (author of the proclamation To the People of Volhynia), who arrived in Volhynia on 21 November 1942. After the failure of talks with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), during which two representatives of the Home Army, Zygmunt Rumel and Krzysztof Markiewicz, were murdered, it was decided on 20 July 1943 to form partisan units in Volhynia.

The following units were formed:

• "Łuna" - under the command of Second Lieutenant Jan Rerutko ("Drzazga"), from 10 November 1943 the unit was commanded by Lt. Zygmunt Kulczycki ("Olgierd"). The "Łuna" unit consisted of 107 partisans.
• "Jastrząb" - under the command of Lieutenant Władysław Czermiński ("Jastrząb") numbering around 150 partisans.
• "Bomba" - under the command of Captain Władysław Kochański ("Bomba", "Wujek"). The unit numbered around 500 partisans.
• "Strzemię" - under the command of Lieutenant Zenon Blachowski ("Strzemię"). The unit numbered around 100 partisans.
• "Gzyms" - under the command of Lieutenant Franciszek Pukacki ("Gzyms") numbering around 80 partisans.
• "Ryszard" - commanded by Lieutenant Ryszard Walczak ("Ryszard"). The unit numbered around 80 partisans.
• "Sokół" - commanded by Lieutenant Michał Fijałka ("Sokół"), numbering around 120 partisans.
• "Kord" - commanded by Lieutenant Kazimierz Filipowicz ("Kord"). The unit numbered about 80 partisans.
• "Piotruś" - commanded by Lieutenant Władysław Cieśliński ("Piotruś"), numbering around 80 partisans.

Formation of the 27th Home Army Infantry Division

At the beginning of January 1944, after the Red Army had crossed the pre-war Polish border, the Home Army command ordered the mobilisation of partisan units in Volhynia and decided to launch Operation Tempest. On 28 January 1944, the 27th Volhynian Infantry Division was formed

In addition to operations against the Germans, the division carried out 16 major combat actions against UPA units, partially removing the threat to the Polish civilian population in the west of Volhynia.

Summary

The maximum number of self-defence outposts was about 128 (July 1943) out of 3,400 settlements in Volhynia where Poles lived. A maximum of 1,500 people served in all partisan units until January 1944, with at least 15,000 UPA members against them. The self-defence and partisan units were formed too late and were too small to prevent the crimes. According to Siemaszko's findings, at least 262 Poles and at least 311 members of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army were killed in the battles between the self-defence and the UPA. Losses among civilians amounted to: 60,000 victims of the Polish population and 2,000-3,000 victims of the Ukrainian population killed in an act of Polish retaliation. Based on these figures, we cannot speak of the events in Volhynia in 1943-1944 as a Polish-Ukrainian war, but rather as the Volhynian massacre.