Talk:Oreshnik (missile)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 21 November 2024

Insert Allegedly prior to (making it impossible for western missile defence systems to intercept.) A Suspicious Whitby class Frigate (talk) 22:36, 21 November 2024 (UTC)

 Not done - The "claimed to have" is sufficient here, as per the wording of the source, for if it does indeed travel at Mach 10, then it is definitely useless against missile defence systems; the only unconfirmed part is the speed. Flemmish Nietzsche (talk) 22:42, 21 November 2024 (UTC)

Revisit this request. I came here to make the same point. This claim, as per the reference, is solely attributed to Putin's own words. And of course he would say that. The only other thing supporting this statement is you @Flemmish Nietzsche, based on your WP:OR expertise on missile defence. Change it to 'difficult to intercept'. Apart from your and Putins' personal opinions, it's an inarguable fact that a missile defence system might intercept this 'new' missile by happy accident. Try to be more encyclopaedic and try to be less smug.

You admit (and you're an expert after all) that the speed is unconfirmed. So your refusal to change absolute language to something more accurate is based on your own "if".

Also, when you say "it is definitely useless against missile defence systems", I presume you meant the polar opposite? Yes?

Oh hang on, I just viewed the article again and I see someone more sensible has corrected you. Thank goodness! Blocked & Muted. Flusapochterasumesch (talk) 22:54, 21 November 2024 (UTC)

Thank you for correcting me, although a less harsh tone would be appreciated. Flemmish Nietzsche (talk) 22:58, 21 November 2024 (UTC)

Apology accepted. And you owe @A Suspicious Whitby class Frigate an apology too. Only six minutes after their correctly reasoned contribution, you totally shut-them-down, when you ought to have been reading the reference to see that you were parroting Mr Putin. For my part I will do my utmost to try to be more tolerant and understanding of the needs of people like you in the future. Flusapochterasumesch (talk) 23:17, 21 November 2024 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 21 November 2024 (2)

Change sentence "The strike occurred after a long-range missile attack by Ukraine in Russia which in turn occurred after the United States, United Kingdom and France — each a NATO member state — granted Ukrainian forces permission to strike targets in Russia using Western-supplied long-range missiles — ATACMS and Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG." to "The strike occurred after a long-range missile attack by Ukraine in Russia which in turn occurred after the United States, United Kingdom and France — each a NATO member state — granted Ukrainian forces permission to strike targets in Russia using Western-supplied long-range missiles — ATACMS and Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG. This decision by NATO leaders came after Russia repeatedly conducted large-scale drone and cruise missile attacks targeting Ukraine's civilian energy infrastructure.". Raimodns (talk) 23:35, 21 November 2024 (UTC)

I don't see why we need to explain the whole chain of escalation/response, when the subject of the page is only the missile and how it has been used; ideally we should also have a source which puts emphasis on the cause for the shift in US/UK/France policy which is also talking about the IRBM strike; this would determine that adding that fact as background would be due. Flemmish Nietzsche (talk) 23:44, 21 November 2024 (UTC)

For once I agree with @Flemmish Nietzsche. This is a missile page, and he's the missile-guy. Prior events are not important to this article. Whilst the timing of this attack is almost certainly important (in the context of events of recent days), it might just be that Putin only just got his new bomb delivered today. I know that if I'd ordered an Oreshnik online, I'd be desperate to try it out the minute it arrived. Flusapochterasumesch (talk) 23:54, 21 November 2024 (UTC)

ATACMS and Storm Shadow aren't 'long range missiles'. ATACMS is a 'long range tactical missile' but also 'short range ballistic missile' as its a longer ranged tactical missile than existing capabilities but tactical missiles are a class of short range missile, hence why it is in the classification of short range ballistic missile (because ballistic is a flight profile type rather than tactical which is a target classification type). Storm Shadow are not long range cruise missiles either, many cruise missiles have ranges well over double or triple the Storm Shadow. The Stowm Shadow are within the short to medium range category for cruise missiles. The media used the language 'long range missile' as an abbreviation of 'long range tactical missile' but tactical systems are short range compared to strategic systems and indeed ATACMS and Storm Shadow are designed for hitting stationary and mobile targets at the rear of engaged forces rather than penetration of large distances to hit strategic higher value targets like protected capital cities or distant ports and facilities. The use of 'long range missile' is inaccurate and misleading. Axialturban (talk) 23:55, 21 November 2024 (UTC)

To further clarify (as a missile guy myself) -- ATACMS is an SRBM as noted; outside of the specific classification bands for ballistic missiles, qualifications like "long range" or "short range" are relative only to the context in which they're considered. For instance, the Tomahawk missile is generally considered a long-range weapon. However, in the context of the Army Multi-domain Task Force fires plan, it represents the mid-range capability in between HIMARS and LRHW/Dark Eagle. In the context of the Ukraine conflict, generally speaking any system that allows for engagements beyond the range of traditional tube and rocket artillery would be considered long-range. So it's neither inaccurate nor misleading, it simply requires context to explain that in this instance it means "capable of striking targets located in Russia from standoff distances in Ukraine". In which case, we should probably just say that, instead of trying to get readers to follow along. I agree that it is unnecessary to explain the chain of justifications for escalation in this article; this article is about the missile, and the relevant text should be about the operational history of the missile strike, not the decisions that led up to it. ⇒SWATJester ^{Shoot Blues, Tell VileRat!} 00:53, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

If there was a 'thumbs up' emoji I'd certainly deploy one now. Context is everything and it's good to have someone around who knows his bombs. I don't suppose the people of Dnipro are too concerned about how far the missile flew - it's all about the effect on their lives and the future threat. Flusapochterasumesch (talk) 01:10, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

I made a compromise by modifying the sentence to say The strike occurred after a long-range missile attack by Ukraine in Russia which in turn occurred after the United States, United Kingdom and France — each a NATO member state — granted Ukrainian forces permission to strike targets in Russia using Western-supplied ATACMS and Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missiles. This addresses the confusion over the "long-range" part. If folks agree we can remove the entire chain of escalation for readability, we can do that as well.⇒SWATJester ^{Shoot Blues, Tell VileRat!} 01:13, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

I only mentioned it because this page is about an intermediate range ballistic missile, which is longer ranged than even a medium range ballistic missile, yet the Ukranian attack was a short range ballistic missile. The wording 'long range attack' seems less misleading as an alternative, because as it stands it reads like Russia's use of the system was a de-escalation rather than an escalation. Just thinking of the reader and how they'll consider the term long range compared to the conflict rather than the state of the conflict at any one time. So my reading was if its just using broad language then the broad terms are for the ATACMS a short range ballistic missile and the Storm Shadow is a short range cruise missile - but yes the attack was a long range attack by Ukranian standards. 58.96.14.201 (talk) 02:38, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

[Proposal] Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 21 November 2024 (3)

Given the conversation that already occurred here in other requests, could we either omit the last line "US officials note that the missile is still experimental and Russia only has a few in its possession, and that it is unlikely to be regularly deployed against Ukraine." or change it to "US officials [speculate]..." I perused quite a bit of Russian media today as well as trying to find any contemporaneous reporting from the last four years on telegram and they didn't seem to have much insight even from their own experts. I think it's fair to doubt the claims from even less informed sources cited here. This might be a separate request but in its current form it might justify including even more context that such claims are being characterized in Russian media as further provocation. (I am not here to debate whether that allegation is valid or if provocation is justified, just that is being characterized that way.) Dmitry Plotnikov, a journalist with Pravda, wrote that, "...CNN immediately released the news that Russia probably has only a few experimental Oreshnik missiles, one of which was used in Dnepropetrovsk. This means that in order for the enemies to finally understand that the jokes are over, it is necessary to repeat as soon as possible..." (I am also not privileging his obviously biased perspective or even trying to advocate for Russian perspectives whatsoever, simply noting the commentary over this very claim which seems no less pompous than what Russian military officials have said.) Dan Lowe (talk) 03:29, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

We could change it to "claimed" or "stated" but we don't technically know if it's speculation. It could be an intelligence-based statement, it could be (reasonable) speculation based on the time, cost, complexity, and manpower of serial production of an IRBM and general economies of force.⇒SWATJester ^{Shoot Blues, Tell VileRat!} 05:23, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

Honestly your qualification seems more accurate, to say that "US officials [estimate]..." and I should probably plead with you for that change alone. But I would think this uncertainty justifies removing the line entirely (and foregoing any of the other context I've suggested). It's nothing but an emotional assurance without further corroboration and being an objectively falsifiable claim should carry that context until evidence is presented. Even an argument based on the approximate calculation you suggested, which would at least give us an idea of whether they know or are just guessing. That's my whole hangup. As it is, the line suggests that they do know and therefore we can be confident that we know too. We have to maximize objectivity to assess our own exposure as members of the public who will be independently affected by the apparently novel tactical capabilities of official adversaries. Dan Lowe (talk) 06:53, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

I don't disagree with you with regard to whether the claim is falsifiable, but it's no less without corroboration than Putin's claims of travelling at Mach 10 and being impossible to intercept (a statement problematic for other reasons such as being undue weight as that's nothing specific to the Oreshnik, it's just a general fact for all ballistic missiles of this size class with regard to Ukraine). But we include that as well because when we have generally accepted reliable sources using those claims with proper attribution (e.g. not in our own voice, but attributed to "US officials claim..." or "Putin says...") then readers can judge the veracity of those claims on their own. Incidentally, that's another reason why we can't say they're speculating -- because the AP (the source in this case) isn't saying they're speculating either. ⇒SWATJester ^{Shoot Blues, Tell VileRat!} 08:21, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

How about "assess" as it would carry both meanings? I won't drag this on past this suggestion, unless more becomes known. It seems moot but for me it's the difference between anticipating an invasion of shovel-wielding conscripts from North Korea, or another Nagasaki. Maybe there's another more appropriate topic to add this context about evolving reassurances from anonymous intelligence. Thanks. Dan Lowe (talk) 00:33, 23 November 2024 (UTC)

References

Typo "Oleshnik"

The missile system in question is called "Oleshnik" instead of "Oreshnik" twice in the article. Please correct? Kttmrfobg (talk) 05:56, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

•  Done⇒SWATJester ^{Shoot Blues, Tell VileRat!} 08:23, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

ATACMS are short range missiles

Please change the related passage. accordingly. 2003:CA:370C:D500:1EE5:8A0:B183:F5D3 (talk) 06:20, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

•  Not done: it's not clear what changes you want to be made. Please mention the specific changes in a "change X to Y" format and provide a reliable source if appropriate. ⇒SWATJester ^{Shoot Blues, Tell VileRat!} 08:24, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

  Somebody already rewrote the whole passage and removed the ATACMS part.

  Thank you. 2003:CA:370C:D500:2F73:B2CE:FDDE:EC27 (talk) 06:53, 23 November 2024 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 22 November 2024

The Oleshnik reportedly uses an MIRV payload, which was shown in unverified footage of the attack.

The Oleshnik reportedly uses an MIRV payload, which was claimed to be shown in unverified footage of the attack. The footage actually displays much less sophisticated MRV strikes, not MIRV strikes. No MARV technology was demonstrated whatsoever. Wabobo3 (talk) 08:16, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

 Not done: please provide reliable sources that support the change you want to be made. Multiple independent reliable sources use language that reports the payload as appearing to be MIRVs. Whether they're right or not about the independent targeting capability, we simply point out what reliable sources are reporting.⇒SWATJester ^{Shoot Blues, Tell VileRat!} 08:30, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

References

"9M729"

Where did 9M729 GRAU index originate from? The source cited doesn't mention it, moreover there's already a missile on wikipedia with that index Novator 9M729. Are these the same missile? Please delete the GRAU index, to comply with source. — Preceding unsigned comment added by L0ll3r (talk • contribs) 08:31, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

•  Done ⇒SWATJester ^{Shoot Blues, Tell VileRat!} 17:21, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 22 November 2024 (2)

https://www.youtube.com/live/n0e6rHG47IU?si=n2IHufYF8bmmqESF&t=1259

Oreshnik should be referred as a variant or derivative from the RS-26. It is not an autonomous system.

On November 21, 2024, during the Pentagon Press Secretary's briefing (United States Department of Defense), Sabrina Singh explicitly and literally confirmed that an RS-26 "Rubezh" Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)-based weapon system was used. PMateus (talk) 08:38, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

•  Not done Both Ukraine and Russia have stated otherwise. We have better, more reliable sources than Youtube that do not characterize it as being a Rubezh, including specifically noting that the US position is that it was *based on* a Rubezh, not that it *is* a Rubezh (e.g. "The new design is based on the previous RS-26 Rubezh ballistic missile, according to the Pentagon.". ⇒SWATJester ^{Shoot Blues, Tell VileRat!} 17:27, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

Number of warheads carried

After "...reportedly uses an MIRV payload" please add "consisting of six separate warheads". Reported by ria.ru in: "Сбить невозможно". Что известно о ракете, которую представил Путин, РИА Новости, 21.11.2024 (not a neutral source, but in sentence marked "reportedly"). Kttmrfobg (talk) 12:34, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

•  Not done -- that section of text no longer exists but the article already references that it's six warheads so this should be moot. ⇒SWATJester ^{Shoot Blues, Tell VileRat!} 17:19, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

  Oh, I'm sorry. Should've seen that, of course. Kttmrfobg (talk) 22:14, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

Oreshnik - high-hypersonic missile

Oreshnik - it is high-hypersonic missile - I must say it is common knowledge that very rare are missiles with High-hypersonic speed(also known as hyper-velocity) and speed of missile is already given in source used in article - above Mach 11. High speed - above usual hypersonic - is Oreshnik missile important feature that distinguish it from other ballistic missiles - and for readers of Wikipedia should be given better description in order to better understand article. It is a big difference for missile in many ways for speed above Mach 10 so it cannot be said just hypersonic as it is not describing it accurately enough.

Many of ballistic missiles are not even hypersonic(speed 5-10 Mach). While editing article I added source to NASA that have definitions of different speeds for moving objects that are not defined only as missiles. NASA made that for a reason to educate people.

It is one of many sources that describes different velocities and this missile is above what is usual considered as hypersonic speed. Such speed definitions are known as a classification of Mach regimes and for speeds above Mach 10 terms like "High-hypersonic" and "hyper-velocity" are commonly used - not just "hypersonic".

US congress and military refers to higher-speed missiles definition for missiles that have speed above mach 10. Term "High-hypersonic" is in use on existing Wikipedia articles.

US Military in declassified booklet "Hypersonic Technology for Military Application" on page 60 defines "High hypersonic" as speeds above Mach 10.

For more google: "Classification of Mach regimes", "high-hypersonic", "high hypersonic regime" and "hyper-velocity". Wording "High Hypersonic" is commonly used to make difference with slower "hypersonic" missiles. Loesorion (talk) 18:26, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

No, and this "I didn't hear that" behavior needs to stop. You've been repeatedly told both in edit summaries and on your user talk page that we cannot make claims that are not supported by reliable sources, and that we cannot use disallowed synthesis to combine the NASA statement into somehow being about the Oreshnik, when it was not. Other Wikipedia articles are not reliable sources. Saying "google it" is not going to suffice. "High hypersonic missile" is not terminology commonly used at all in the common parlance around ballistic missiles, because functionally all ballistic missiles are hypersonic, and a missile's size class directly correlates to its range and therefore speed. There are no reliable sources that refer to the Oreshnik as a "high-hypersonic missile." NASA does not refer to Oreshnik as a high hypersonic missile -- NASA does not make such classifications about foreign missiles and furthermore, even if it did, a single offhand reference from NASA does not contradict that zero reliable sources use that terminology with regard to the Oreshnik. Saying something is "common knowledge" is meaningless as far as Wikipedia is concerned, even if your assertion was correct which it most certainly isn't: every single ballistic missile in this range bracket exceeds those speeds, so it is far from being "very rare" (which is also original research you've been trying to insert into the article); see e.g. Minuteman III: Mach 23, RS-26 Rubezh: Mach 20+, RS-24 Yars: Mach 25, RSD-10 Pioneer: Mach 21, RT-2PM2 Topol-M: Mach 22, same as the base Topol, UR-100N: Mach 22, etc. None of those ICBMs or IRBMs are commonly referred to as "high-hypersonic". Further, your changes would be inappropriate to add in the lede, as you've been seeking to do, because per WP:LEDE a lede section should only be summarizing the body content of the article, and our article's body text makes no such claims about the missile being high-hypersonic (or "rare", or any of the other original research you've been trying to add). ⇒SWATJester ^{Shoot Blues, Tell VileRat!} 21:22, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

You need to stop your Wikipedia:Disruptive editing and try to collaborate with fellow editors on editing and improving of article instead of lecturing about policies you only use partially to suit yourself. I have summarized my edit in article based on source with my own words as editor all within Wikipedia policies.

I do not know your competencies but based on your writing it is clear you do not understand some basics here and yet you are lecturing me.

"because functionally all ballistic missiles are hypersonic, and a missile's size class directly correlates to its range and therefore speed."

Not all ballistic missiles are hypersonic for start as I have already written. Missile size also do not correlates to range and do not correlate to speed.

For example well known 9К72 «Эльбрус» or Scud missile in C version has max speed on trajectory of 1500 m/s or 4.37 Mach - so it is not Hypersonic missile but it is ballistic missile. It is 11,164 meters long and has maximum range of 300km. Mass is 5862kg.

In same time also well known 9K720 Iskander is 7.3 meters long has range of 500km and speed of 2000 m/s or Mach 5.9 that makes it hypersonic. Mass is 3800kg.

So smaller missile - 9K720 Iskander that is lighter has bigger range and higher speed and first one Scud missile is not even a hypersonic.

So no correlations between speed, length or size and range, and hence it is important to understand what is written in source and to understand matter you are dealing with in order to correctly summarize it from source to article.

I hope editors including me are here to collaborate and learn in order to produce better article and not to attack each other over matter specially if we lack basic knowledge to understand what it is about.

NASA as source was used to show that certain speed is called by different name. If you wanted to learn instead of lecture you would use all terms I written before here and searched for meaning in order to learn, instead you started attacking me about matter you do not understand.

I have written about how to search and given one source so here comes links about "High-hypersonic" and classifications of missiles based on speed

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA208696 already mentioned booklet from 1989 "Hypersonic Technology for Military Application" on page 60

more about high-hypersonic

https://fortune.com/2024/03/15/russia-china-hypersonic-innovation-holding-us-back-politics-tech/

https://www.galaxyclasses.co.in/details?res_type=ca&res_id=7569

https://euro-sd.com/2024/06/articles/38866/countering-the-hypersonic-threat/

Wikipedia article about "High-hypersonic"

[[1]]

It is common knowledge for people that understand matter that missiles above Mach 10 are rare and I cannot here summarize all missiles in world but here is one nice article to learn why it is rare and what happens when speed start to be over Mach 10 and influence of sheath of plasma on flight around and above Mach 10

https://www.geostrategy.org.uk/research/britains-hypersonic-challenge-strategic-opportunities-and-risks/

So it is important to correctly summarize source and understand that there is important difference if missile is Mach 5 or above Mach 10 in order to have correct classification. Loesorion (talk) 23:01, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

That wall of text shows a complete lack of understanding for both the subject matter and for the discussion that's been had thus far, to the point that there's no benefit in continuing. I was not comparing missiles within the same range band. I was comparing missiles across range bands. Your examples of the Scud C and Iskander are both for SRBMs -- short range ballistic missiles, both with lower speeds, lower ranges, and smaller sizes than the IRBM-sized Oreshnik. You literally picked the two least comparable examples as if they were meaningful. If you had sufficient knowledge of the underlying subject matter you'd know that the Scud is slower speed at a higher mass because the Scud is liquid-fueled, unlike the solid-fueled Iskander. So thank you for confirming that you agree with me that size and range band directly correlates to speed. Now, I will once again remind you that what you keep asserting as "common knowledge" has no basis whatsoever in fact -- every single IRBM and ICBM (as the Oreshnik is based on the Rubezh which straddles both range bands) that exists in the world today is both hypersonic and has speeds exceeding Mach 10. The point is not about whether "high-hypersonic" means Mach 10+ -- it's whether that terminology is commonly used to describe the Oreshnik by reliable sources, which it is not. If it's "common knowledge" like you say, you should have no trouble finding a reliable source that directly supports your claim without requiring synthesis or other disallowed original research to do so. Meanwhile, as you have yet to provide the required sources to directly support your claim about the Oreshnik, there's nothing further to discuss. But if you continue to cast aspersions and personal attacks against other editors, you're going to have a very short editing career in the future. ⇒SWATJester ^{Shoot Blues, Tell VileRat!} 23:22, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

Dear Wikipedia colleague, you need to understand that missiles with different speed are called with different names, you gave your previous opinion that I have quoted and replied and now you are writing that I do not understand about fuel differences, you should have written about fuel before and still my answer would be the same as there is no correlation between size class, range and speed - in a way you have written.

Hwasong-6 is shorter than Scud variant I written also liquid fuel but have grater range. Other variant of Scud with same length and diameter also have different range.

So it is about type of fuel, size, type and weight of warhead, shape, design and production technology and other factors that are important regarding missile characteristics and they do not correlate as they can give as different results for same size class and have in same time different speeds.

So I do not understand how I have confirmed correlation when there is no one.

Missiles with solid fuel can be also different for same or similar size and have different speed and range and so on also without correlation because of already mentioned factors in design and production.

Basic thing was to understand that not all ballistic missiles are hypersonic and that not all hypersonic speed is the same for all missiles above Mach 10.

I hope you will not write next that I do not understand something else and so on - I am here to help people to have better understanding of matter in question not to engage in endless writings.

Lets say for now that I do not understand anything, but does Missile Defense Agency do not understand when they qualified missile according to speed into:

1.Subsonic: less than Mach 1

2.Supersonic: Mach 1-5

3.Hypersonic: Mach 5-10

4.High Hypersonic: Mach 10-25 (7,700-19,200 mph)

Here is source

https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/documents/4365/2021_017_001_735101.pdf

Here in this Talk topic is missile speed classification so lets stick to that one without involving other topics. Loesorion (talk) 00:35, 23 November 2024 (UTC)

There's nothing to discuss unless you're going to provide a source that uses the terms "high-hypersonic" and "rare" to describe Oreshnik. That's the edit you're trying to make. That's the edit you consistently refuse to source. Nobody is disputing that the term "high-hypersonic" exists as a term to describe speeds in excess of Mach 10; the dispute is that it's not *commonly* used by reliable sources in the context of ballistic missiles (especially IRBM class missiles, all of which are within this speed band, which is why it's not specified in practice) nor is it used at all specifically with regard to the Oreshnik, which is what is necessary for inclusion in *this* article on *this* page. A random slide from some random security engineer's entirely unrelated powerpoint on "Implementing DevSecOps in MDA GMD" from several years ago before the Oreshnik's speed was ever revealed does not constitute a reliable source. We cannot even say it's an authoritative statement from MDA. It's not even hosted by MDA, it's on some random third party university hosting from the Software Engineering Institute. There's no indication that the MDA endorses the claim, there's no indication that the engineer who made the statement has any expertise in missiles, there's none of the traditional indicia of reliability that we expect from non-perennially reliable sources such as peer-review, fact-checking, etc. What we have is a single, non-specific reference, on an unrelated document of questionable provenance, with no indication of reliability, being put forth to support a claim that cannot be supported from the source itself. That does not pass muster. ⇒SWATJester ^{Shoot Blues, Tell VileRat!} 00:54, 23 November 2024 (UTC)

I had a look at the PDF document you posted the link for, @Loesorion - just out of curiousity. It appears to be hosted in a document repository for the Software Engineering Institute of Carnegie Mellon University - but any clever student could sneak a document into that location if they chose to. The document is a 'slideshow' that has been morphed into a pdf. It has logos belonging to the DoD Missile Defence Agency, which are freely available in the public domain. So you see, there is no information or evidence as to the provenance, accuracy, authenticity and/or author of this colourful 'slideshow' - except a publicly available logo. I'm not asserting it is bogus - but I am asserting that it cannot be relied upon as a source, unless it can be verified and endorsed by the DoD. Flusapochterasumesch (talk) 15:30, 23 November 2024 (UTC)

Loesorion, I understand that Vladimir has given you orders to polish-up this article and make it look as goodski as possible. But when you make statements like "Scud missileski in C version ... is 11,164 meters long" you lose all credibility. A seven-mile-long missile? What kinds of experimental pharmaceutical compounds are you being involuntarily injected with?!?!?!? Flusapochterasumesch (talk) 00:57, 23 November 2024 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 22 November 2024 (3)

Add RS-28 Sarmat to 'See similar.' Wikiloginproton (talk) 23:18, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

Done... - Adolphus79 (talk) 18:46, 23 November 2024 (UTC)

The name of rocket transcription is wrong.

The name of the rocket Oreshnik means actually a Nut Tree common nut in the areas of Europe and Russian area of Asia. And they fired that missile with no explosives so it end up arriving hitting only kinetically meaning no explosives as people confirm. Its like they fired a Nut tree that flied the 10 Mach which ware around the 3500m/s 3.5km/s. Not intercepted, Markoshiva (talk) 19:35, 23 November 2024 (UTC)

No, it doesn't! "Oreshnik" (the hazel) - hazel wood is the traditional material used to carve the cudgel. See cudgel war. Not the tree, it's the wood.--87.170.204.97 (talk) 07:08, 24 November 2024 (UTC)

The development baseline

More likely to be based on R-30 bulava 91.219.243.137 (talk) 19:53, 24 November 2024 (UTC)

Hi, to help us from publishing original research, do you have a reliable source that we could cite for that information? - Adolphus79 (talk) 20:28, 24 November 2024 (UTC)

Jeffrey Lewis (academic) and Aaron Stein believe that it is the same missile as the RS-26 with possibly minor front-end modifications. (Note: Lewis and Stein are both experts for the purpose of WP:EXPERTSPS as to the reliability of the podcast source.) I've seen no reliable sources or expert analysis that suggests it is based on the R-30. ⇒SWATJester ^{Shoot Blues, Tell VileRat!} 21:20, 24 November 2024 (UTC)

FWIW though I'd expect that without decent-quality imagery of the missile itself, nobody's going to be able to authoritatively resolve the origin question one way or another. ⇒SWATJester ^{Shoot Blues, Tell VileRat!} 21:27, 24 November 2024 (UTC)

Speed

Putin said in his speech that the missile attacks at a speed of Mach 10, not Mach 11. Chaptagai (talk) 12:11, 25 November 2024 (UTC)

@Chaptagai,  Done -- Iri1388 (talk) 13:08, 25 November 2024 (UTC)

I think you made a mistake in changing this. I understand that Putin said the missile's potential velocity was in excess of Mach 10, however Ukrainian military intelligence said it was travelling at Mach 11 in its terminal phase - presumably they measured it as such via radar or some other means. Reuters and many other sources report this, e.g. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-says-new-missile-fired-by-russia-flew-15-minutes-faster-than-mach-11-2024-11-22/ Flusapochterasumesch (talk) 22:12, 25 November 2024 (UTC)

@Flusapochterasumesch @Chaptagai, Associated Press reported the missile reach Mach 10. About Reuters, your reply is true. -- Iri1388 (talk) 13:14, 27 November 2024 (UTC)

impact energy

• Talking heads keep increasing the estimation of destructive energy of impact. It has reached the level of medium sized nuclear weapon! I'd propose that a table be injected that relates the terminal velocity (in mach #?) of the munition to its impact energy relative to that of TNT (or some other *standard* unit). The key inside I developed on the day of its first was that at ~3km, then energy was ~2 to ~3x that of an equivalent mass of TNT. So even if the munition was 1ton, then impact energy would be around 3tons of TNT, far from nuclear. Possibly people are confusing tons an 1kt. With ~36 warheads, possibly each 'munition' is around 100kg.

I'll also add, it takes a vehicle like 'starship' which has on the order of 10kt of Methalox to be on the stage of a nuclear destructive force. Also add, that at early re-entry, sub-orbital velocity are around 7.5km/sec. I'll (login) and clean this up later today. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 73.61.120.10 (talk) 16:01, 28 November 2024 (UTC)

Unless a reliable source presents this information, it would be original research and not includable in the article. ⇒SWATJester ^{Shoot Blues, Tell VileRat!} 16:10, 28 November 2024 (UTC)

A table of 1/2 mv^2 is original research? 73.238.127.216 (talk) 20:19, 28 November 2024 (UTC)

All the numbers I've come up with can be sourced, which is the part about I'll clean it up later. But the fundamental issue is that a section of 'estimated impact' energy would provide value to the webpage. 73.238.127.216 (talk) 20:22, 28 November 2024 (UTC)

Yes. A table that purports to include terminal velocity vs. mass of a munition for which no reliable statistics publicly exist, is almost certainly original research. Unless such a table is specifically cited as being applicable to the Oreshnik, it would not be usable. Additionally, as an IP editor, please note that you're not allowed to edit the article in the first place due to community sanctions. But I can tell you right now that there is zero chance that your proposed table meets the inclusion criteria of our core content policies.⇒SWATJester ^{Shoot Blues, Tell VileRat!} 23:48, 28 November 2024 (UTC)